The Contract Clause of Action Under the Taft-Hartley Act by Wallace, Leon Harry
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1949
The Contract Clause of Action Under the Taft-
Hartley Act
Leon Harry Wallace
Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation




VOLUME XVI DECEMBER, 1949 NUMBER 1
THE CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
I.
W ITH masterful confusion, the Congress of the United States
enacted in 1947 a law which provided, among other things, that
suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation, representing employees in an industry affecting commerce, or
between such labor organizations, might be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy, or without regard to the dtizen-
ship of the parties.' It was further provided that any such labor organi-
zation or employer shall be bound by the acts of its agents, and that
any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in
behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United
States, and that any money judgment against such a labor organization
shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and not
against any individual or his assets.? For the purpose of determining
whether any person is acting as an agent of another person, the act
provided that the question of whether the specific act performed was
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.!
First, for the purpose of understanding, it is necessary to consider
whether the Congress intended only to remedy a jurisdictional or pro-
cedural defect arising from the fact that in some state jurisdictions a;
union cannot sue or be sued because it is not recognized as a legal
entity. If this is true, then the cause of action involved is a state cause
of action arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement. If the
'Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, P. L. 101, sec. 301 (a), 80th Cong., 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 151 et seq.
2Sec. 301 (b), The Act.
3 Sec. 301 (e), The Act.
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particular state does not recognize that any legal relationships arise
from a collective-bargaining agreement as between employer and
union, then the furnishing of a federal forum, despite the lack of
requirement of diversity and amount, would result only in bringing
the union into the federal forum so that it might file a motion to dis-
miss on the merits. If the particular state, however, does recognize
that legal relationships arise from a collective-bargaining agreement
as between employer and union, the interpretation of those relation-
ships (the substantive right) may not be the same from state to state.
Thus, the same contract between the same employer and the same
union, covering operations in many states, may give rise to materially
different causes of action in different states as a result of the same
conduct, which is alleged to constitute the breach.
Second, it is also necessary to consider whether the Congress in-
tended to create a federal substantive right. If this is true, it is unnec-
essary to consider the problem of the propriety of the grant of juris-
diction, if the federally created right can be upheld, or the problem
of whether there is any state substantive right, and, if so, what the
nature of it is. It will be necessary, however, for the federal courts to
determine the legal consequences of the federal contract right.
The Congressional intent is unclear.
II.
A brief review of the legislative history of the act reveals facts,
which, taken alone, would sustain a finding of Congressional intent
for either alternative.
One of the strong opponents of the legislation, Senator Murray,
contended that the federal courts had always had jurisdiction to enter-
tain suits for breach of collective-bargaining contracts, and bad
awarded money damages, where the requirements as to amount and
diversity of citizenship exist; he contended that every district court
would still be required to look to state substantive law to determine
the question of violation, and that the contract section of the act did
not create a new cause of action, but merely extended federal juris-
diction by removing the requirements of amount and diversity of citi-
zenship.4
4 93 Cong. Rec. 4153 (April 25, 1947). It is obvious that Senator Murray considered
the proposed contract clause to relate only to a jurisdictional or procedural matter. His
interpretation was never questioned in subsequent debate, or in any of the Committee
Reports.
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One of the sponsors of the act, Senator Taft, asserted that the pur-
pose of Title III is to give the employer and employee the right to go
to the federal courts to bring suit to enforce the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement.'
The language of the Report of the Committee on Education and
Labor of the House of Representatives could be construed to support
either alternative.'
On the other hand, the distinction between the jurisdictional prob-
lem, and the substantive right problem was clearly recognized in the
Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate,
but whether the removal of a jurisdictional defect or the creation of
a substantive right was intended by the proposed legislation is open
to question.7
193 Cong. Rec. 4265 (April 28, 1947). It is dear that Senator Taft intended that the
Federal courts should have jurisdiction of actions based on collective-bargaining agreements,
but his reported statements do not reveal whether he considered whether the substantive
right involved was to be a state or federal right.
IHouse Misc. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 46 (1947). It was stated in that
part of the Report which referred to what was ultimately Section 301 of The Act that:
"It is provided that a labor organization whose activities affect commerce is to be
bound by the acts of its agents, and may sue or be sued as an entity in the courts of the
United States ...
"When labor organizations make contracts with employers, such organizations should
be subject to the same judicial remedies and processes in respect of proceedings involving
violations of such contracts as those applicable to all other citizens. Labor organizations
cannot justifiably ask to be treated as responsible contracting parties unless they are willing
to assume the responsibilities of such contracts to the same extent as the other party must
assume his. . . . For this reason, not only does the section (referring to what was ulti-
mately Sec. 301 of The Act) make the labor organization equally suable . . ."
It will be noted that the report of the House Committee uses language which goes
beyond the question of jurisdiction, and refers to a generally applicable and uniform
substantive right. Since it must be presumed that the House of Representatives was aware
of the fact that the Congress could not create a state substantive right, it may be argued
that it contemplated a federal substantive right, which would necessarily be defined and
delineated by the federal courts.
Senate Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, pp. 15-17. In referring to the proposed contract section, the Senate com-
mittee observed:
"We feel that the aggrieved party should also have a right of action in the Federal
courts ...
"The laws of many states make it difficult to sue effectively and to recover a judgment
against an unincorporated labor union. It is difficult to reach the funds of a union to
satisfy a judgment against it. In some States it is necessary to serve all the members before
an action can be maintained against the union. This is an almost impossible process ....
"If unions can break agreements with relative impunity then such agreements do not
tend to stabilize industrial relations. . . . Without some effective method of assuring
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The Conference Report by the Committee on Conference notes that
the jurisdictional test of the Senate amendment, rather than the test in
the House bill, was contained in the Conference agreement 8 Whether
this implies that the contract section, as finally agreed upon, was in-
tended to remove a jurisdictional defect or to create a substantive
right is left unanswered.
III.
If Section 301 of Title III of the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947) is regarded merely as a grant of jurisdic-
freedom from economic warfare for the terms of the agreement, there is little reason
why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
"Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to promote industrial
peace through faithful performance by the parties, collective agreements affecting inter-
state commerce should be enforceable in the Federal courts. Our amendment would pro-
vide for suits by unions and against unions as legal entities in the Federal courts in dis-
putes affecting commerce . . .. (The provision that the disputes affect commerce was
changed in the section as finally passed.)
"The initial obstacle (emphasis supplied) in enforcing the terms of a collective agree-
ment against a union which has breached its provisions is the difficulty of subjecting the
union to process. The great majority of labor unions are unincorporated associations. At
common law voluntary associations are not suable as such (citing cases). As a consequence
the rule in most jurisdictions, in the absence of statute, is that unincorporated labor unions
cannot be sued in their common name . . .:
"Some States have enacted statutes which subject unincorporated associations to the
jurisdiction of law courts. These statutes are by no means uniform; some pertain to
fraternal societies, welfare organizations, associations doing business, etc., and in some
States the courts have excluded labor unions from their application.
"In the Federal courts whether an unincorporated union can be sued depends upon
the procedural rules of the State in which the action is brought. . . .
"There are no Federal laws giving either an employer or even the Government itself
any right of action against a union for any breach of contract. Thas there is no 'substantive
right' to enforce, (emphasis supplied) in order to make the union suable as such in
Federal courts.
"It is apparent that until all jurisdictions, and particularly the Federal Government,
authorize actions against labor unions as legal entities, there will not be the mutual re-
sponsibility necessary to vitalize collective-bargaining agreements. The Congress has pro-
tected the right of workers to organize. It has passed laws to encourage and promote
collective bargaining.
"Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable
contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility
upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace."
It will be noted that the report of the Senate Committee speaks alternatively of the
jurisdictional problem, and of the substantive right problem. It might reasonably be con-
cluded that the Committee contemplated rectifying both of the defects discussed, or that
it failed to understand the distinction between them. In either event, the federal courts
are free to decide the question.8 House Misc. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 65, (1947). Conference Report
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tion to the federal courts, to eliminate procedural defects inherent in
state procedure, it is necessary to inquire whether this action is con-
sistent with the provisions of the Federal Constitution concerning the
powers and functions of the federal courts.
At least one constitutional basis, possibly the only basis, for uphold-
ing such a grant of jurisdiction is the provision under Article III ex-
tending federal judicial power to all cases arising under the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States.' If the Congress cannot confer
jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article III, the grant of jurisdiction
to be good must be based upon the existence of a "federal question"
in cases involving breaches of collective-bargaining contracts. It has
been said that at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action
must be a right conferred by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States.'0 . The jurisdictional basis then must rest, in one way
or another, on the fact that section 301 deals with contracts between
employers and labor organizations "in an industry affecting com-
merce.
)
by Committee on Conference. In discussing the contract section of the Act, the Committee
on Conference observes:
"Section 302 of the House bill and section 301 of the Senate amendment contained
provisions relating to suits by and against labor organizations in the courts of the United
States. The conference agreement follows in general the provisions of the House bill
with changes therein hereafter noted.
"Section 302 (a) of the House bill provided that any action for or proceeding involv-
ing a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization might be
brought by either party in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without regard to the amount in controversy, if such controversy affected com-
merce, or the court otherwise had jurisdiction. Under the Senate amendment the jurisdic-
tional test was whether the employer was in an industry affecting commerce, or whether
the labor organization represented employees in such an industry. This test contained in
the conference agreement rather than the test in the House bill which required that the
'contract affect commerce.'"
Quare: Does this language import an intent by the Congress to remove a jurisdictional
or procedural defect, or to create a Federal cause of action, which must necessarily be de-
fined by the Federal courts?
9 U. S. CONST., ART. III, § 2. "Sec. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases
in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority; . . ."
10 In Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 112 (1936), Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo said that "a right or immunity created by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action.
• . . The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or
laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, or defeated if they receive
another." While the Court has made distinctions between "a case" and one "arising
under" as applied to the Constitution and to the same terminology used in a federal statute,
the language of the Court does not indicate any distinction of meaning, although this
language was applied to a statute.
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More than a century ago, Chief Justice Marshall defined the scope
of a case "arising under" as used in the Constitution.'i In a cause in-
volving the Bank of the United States, the propriety of federal juris-
diction was in issue. Marshall, writing the opinion for the court, held
that because the bank had been chartered by the Congress, there was a
sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction, regardless of the nature of the
cause of action to which the bank was a party. Marshall observed that
the creation of the bank by an act of Congress "is the first ingredient
in the case-is its origin-is that from which every other part arises."
The rule of the Bank of the United States case was reiterated in many
other cases.' However, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinc-
tion between the identical words used in the Constitution and in
statutes, pointing out that certain cases were concerned with the gen-
eral statutory grant to district courts of jurisdiction over federal ques-
tions, and were not concerned with the constitutional grantY3
1 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
12 Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U. S. 449 (1884); The Pacific Railroad Re-
moval Cases (Union Pacific R. Co. v. Myers), 115 U. S. 1 (1885); Matter of Dunn, 212
U. S. 374 (1909) ; American Bank and Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256
U. S. 350 (1921) ; Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Tex., 268 U. S. 449 (1925) ;
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia, S. C., v. Mitchell, 277 U. S. 213 (1928).
These cases have been limited by statute, but never by subsequent constitutional construc-
tion. The survival of the rule has been acknowledged by Mr. Justice Stone in People of
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476, 485 (1933); and by Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 114 (1936).
13 Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his opinion concurring with the judgment, but dissenting
with the reasoning of another opinion in National Mut. Ins. Co. of District of Columbia v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173 (1949) observed: As this Court has had
occasion to observe, a "'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and some-
thing different for another." (Citing cases.) Similarly, as students of federal jurisdiction
have taken pains to point out, the "substantial identity of the words" in the constitutional
and statutory grants of federal-question jurisdiction, "does not, of course, require, on that
score alone, an identical interpretation." Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional
Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 393, 405, n. 47 (1936). "Confusion of
the two is a natural, but not an insurmountable, hazard. . . . It has never heretofore
been doubted that the constitutional grant of power is broader than the federal-question
jurisdiction which Congress has from time to time thought to confer on district courts by
statute... Indeed, were we to adopt the view that the Gully rule is a test applicable
to the constitutional phrase, we 'ould effectively repudiate Chief Justice Marshall's con-
clusion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, that Congress can allow
a federally chartered corporation to bring all its litigation into federal courts for the
reason that, solely by virtue of the corporation's federal origin, all suits to which the cor-
poration is a party are suits 'arising under... the laws of the United States' within the
meaning of Article III .. " See also Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S.
199 (1877). For a comprehensive background analysis of the federal-question problem,
and a collection of cases, see Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TuLANE
L. REV. 362 (1942); Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions,
90 U. or PA. L. REv. 639 (1942).
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It has been suggested that Congress has created a legal entity, the
labor union, for certain purposes only, to carry out its power under the
commerce clause1 The courts might find this a sufficient analogy to
the bank and other federally chartered corporations to be able to hold
that cases brought under section 301 were cases arising under the Con-
stitution and the laws of the United States. It is difficult to commend
this device, however, since neither Congress nor the courts have con-
sidered unions as federal entities, any more than they have considered
corporations to be federal entities in cases arising under the Sherman
Act.a
Recently, an opinion in the Supreme Court of the United States has
suggested that Congress might confer jurisdiction on the federal courts
in the exercise of Article I powers. ' In a case, holding that Congress
could confer jurisdiction on district courts to hear cases brought by
residents of the District of Columbia, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote an
opinion, concurred in by Justices Black and Burton, holding that the
Congressional power under Article I "to exercise exclusive legislation
in all cases whatsoever, over such district . . . ".7 and "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers . . . and all other powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the government of the United States... "2,8 was sufficient
to sustain the Congressional grant of jurisdiction. This opinion dearly
upholds the Congressional grant of jurisdiction under the Article I
power, separate and apart from the power (or limitation of power) to
21 In Pullman S. C. M. Co. v. Local Union No. 2928, United Steelworkers, 152 F. 2d
493, 498 (C. C. A. 7th 1945), Judge Sparks observed: "It may also be urged that Con-
gress gave legal entity to this Union for certain purposes only and that such status will
not extend beyond those purposes and their accomplishment. . . . The Act gave the
Union as an entity a plenitude of power to accomplish the purposes honestly and it re-
quired the employer to honestly deal with the Union as an entity in the accomplishment of
the same purposes. The Union was given the right in its own name to bargain, and con-
tract, and as an entity to enforce such contract in courts of law. To say that either Congress
or the Labor Union intended that the employer could not likewise seek relief in a court
of law against the same entity for fraudulently accomplishing the purposes of the Act,
would be to attribute to them a characteristic which, to say the least, would not be chari-
table." While this was dictum as far as our question is concerned, it indicates, nevertheless,
a possible form of judicial reasoning.
15 Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209; 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.
36 National Mut. Ins. Co. of District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 69
Sup. Ct. 1173 (1949).
17 U. S. CONsr., ART. I, § 8, cl. 17.
Is U. S. CoNsr., ART. I, § 8, ci. 18.
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grant jurisdiction under section 2 of Article III. If this is true, the
same considerations should apply to the Article I power of Congress
to regulate commerce among the several statese' which is the basic
power underlying section 301. Consequently, it would afford an easy
answer to assert that Congress had the power to confer jurisdiction on
the district courts in cases between employers and unions involving
collective-bargaining contracts as a part of its general power to regu-
late commerce, and despite any limitation of power in Article III.
However, the easy answer is presently denied us. Mr. Justice Rutledge
wrote an opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring in
the result of the opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, but vigorously dis-
19 In the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, in the District of Columbia case, it is said,
"It is too late to hold that judicial functions incidental to Art. I powers of Congress cannot
be conferred on courts existing under Art. III for it has been done with this Court's ap-
proval. (Citation)
"Congress is given power by Art. I to pay debts of the United States. That involves as
an incident the determination of disputed claims. We have held unanimously that con-
gressional authority under Art. I, not the Art. III jurisdiction over suits to which the
United States is a party, is the sole source of power to establish the Court of Claims and
of the judicial power which that court exercises. (Citation)
"Congress also is given power in Art. I to make uniform laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcies. That this, and not the judicial power under Art. III, is the source of our system
of reorganizations and bankruptcy is obvious. (Citation.) But not only may the district
courts be required to handle these proceedings but Congress may add to their jurisdiction
cases between the trustee and others that, but for the bankruptcy powers, would be beyond
their jurisdiction because of lack of diversity required by Art. III. (Citation) . . ." Thus
the Court held that Congress had power to authorize an Art. III court to entertain a
non-Art. III suit because such judicial power was conferred under Art. I. Indeed the
present Court has assumed, without even discussion, that Congress has such power. In
Williams v. Austrian, 331 U. S. 642, the Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, said that
". . . Congress intended by the elimination of sec. 23 (from Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act) to establish the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear plenary suits brought by
a reorganization trustee, even though diversity or other usual ground for federal jurisdic-
tion is lacking. (Emphasis supplied.)
". .. The fact that the congressional power over bankruptcy granted by Art. I could
open the court to the trustee does not mean that such suits arise under the laws of the
United States; but it does mean that Art. I can supply a source of judicial power for their
adjudication. The distinction is important and it is decisive on this issue." (Editor's Note.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter contends that the bankruptcy cases are federal-question cases and
that the jurisdiction power emanates from Articie III.)
"We conclude that where Congress in the exercise of its powers under Art. I finds it
necessary to provide those on whom its power is exerted with access to some kind of
court or tribunal for determination of controversies that are within the traditional concept
of the justiciable, it may open the regular federal courts to them regardless of lack of
diversity of citizenship.
"We could not of course countenance any exercise of this plenary power . . . if it
were such as to draw into congressional control subjects over which there has been no
delegation of power to the Federal Government.
20 U. S. CoNsr., Art. I, § 8, d. 4.
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senting from the reasoning.2' In this opinion, citizens of the District
were found to be citizens of a "state" for jurisdictional purposes so
that the Congressional grant of jurisdiction rested comfortably within
the expressed confines of Article III. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with
whom Mr. Justice Reed concurred, and Mr. Chief Justice Vinson,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined, wrote dissenting opinions.
On analysis, the differences of opinion between the opinions of Mr.
Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Rutledge present problems which are
not insuperable. The Jackson opinion does not admit of the possi-
bility that under its reasoning, the case could be taken one step further
and fitted into the confines of section 2 of Article III. It demands the
acceptance of the proposition of the power to grant jurisdiction beyond
the limitations of Article III. The Rutledge opinion admits of no
flexibility in section 2 of Article III, except by his expanded definition
of "state," and demands the acceptance of the legal propositions ap-
plied to factual situations entirely different from those presented by
the problems of section 301, and assumes that a principle adopted for
some purposes must be applied to all fact situations. Neither position'
is judicially imperative.
Instead of laboring with the question as one which necessarily in-
volves the problem of a conflict between express power to confer juris-
diction conferred by absolute definition more than a century and a
half ago, and implied power to confer jurisdiction never previously
recognized, it might be a simpler solution to compromise the judicial
absolutes presented and to find that, in particular circumstances, tho
conferring of jurisdiction on district courts for certain purposes was,
a proper and valid device in the exercise of Article I powers. For
present purposes, the conferring of jurisdiction on the federal courts
over contracts between employers and labor unions in an industry
affecting commerce could be held a valid regulatory device to be used
in the exercise of the commerce power expressly conferred on Con-
gress. Having concluded this, one step only is necessary to find that
any case involving such a contract is one arising under the Constitu-
21 Mr. Justice Rutledge said, ". . . federal court adjudication of disputes arising pur-
suant to bankruptcy and other legislation is conventional federal-question jurisdiction. And
no case cited in any of today's opinions remotely suggests the contrary." p. 1187. Mr. jus-
tice Rutledge found no problem in defining the term "state," as used in Art. III, differently
than its historical meaning. It may be questioned reasonably whether the Constitution-
makers considered the non-existent citizens of a non-existent District of Columbia as
citizens of a state or that they considered the proposed federal district as a state.
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tion and the laws of the United States, and fits into the limited area
imposed by section 2 of Article III.
This does not imply that the Congress could confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts indiscriminately, to the point that the state courts
would be ousted of jurisdiction of all cases. The suggestion applies
only to the conferring of jurisdiction dealing with, or, if you please,
arising under, the express powers which are conferred on Congress by
the Constitution.
Assuming, for the purpose of this section, that the Congress in-
tended only to confer jurisdiction over contracts between employers
and unions in an industry affecting commerce, and did not intend to
create a federal substantive right, there are two other problems which
should be considered.
First, it is necessary to consider whether section 301 is an innovation
in recognizing that the union as an unincorporated association may be
sued as a legal entity in the federal courts. The answer to this, of
course, must be in the negative.
A generation ago, this question was expressly raised and decided. "
Perhaps it is necessary to interpret the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Coronado case as applying only to situations arising under the
Sherman Act. Nevertheless, to that limited extent, labor unions were
regarded as legal entities. The rule of the Coronado case has since
been codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule
would cover suits brought in federal courts to enforce a federal sub-
stantive right, but if no such right is involved, and the jurisdiction de-
pends on diversity, then the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins24
22United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922). Mr. Chief
Justice Taft observed that " . . it is after all in essence and principle merely a procedural
matter." (p. 390.) It was assumed generally after the Coronado decision that unincor-
porated associations could sue and be sued in the federal courts. Later decisions demon-
strated that the generalization was untrue. See Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289
U. S. 113 (1933). It can only be concluded that for certain purposes (such as for the
purpose of effectuating the purposes of the Sherman Act) unincorporated associations were
regarded as entities by the Court. For a comprehensive analysis and collection of cases,
see, Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51
YALE L. J. 40 (1941).
23 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) ; 28 U. S. C. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States. Rule 17 (b): ". . . In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held; except that
a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law
of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or
against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States."
24 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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should apply and state law should govern. It was argued by Senator
Murray that because federal courts already had jurisdiction on a di-
versity basis in actions involving collective-bargaining contracts, the
proposed legislation only extended the jurisdiction.!' This overlooks
the fact that such jurisdiction could only be exercised in states where
the law of the state recognized such an action. A cause of action is
apparently contemplated and provided under section 301 (a) regard-
less of diversity. It would be a futile gesture to provide jurisdiction
for suability, if no cause of action existed, unless it was intended to
create a federal substantive right to be interpreted by federal law as
developed by the federal courts.
Since section 303 of the Act creates new causes of action for expressly
defined (federal) torts, it seems reasonable to infer that Congress did
not intend that section 301 (b), which provides that a union "shall be
bound by the acts of its agents," should create thereby a liability for
every tort which might be committed by one of its agents. If Congress
did intend to create such rights under section 301 of the act, then
the jurisdictional grant in section 303 is unnecessary and actually in
conflict with that of section 301. However, since section 303 provides
that suits brought thereunder shall be subject to the limitations and
provisions of section 301, the responsibility of a union for its agents
created by section 301 (b) should be equally applicable to contract
violations and to torts defined by section 303.
Second, some consideration should be given to the nature of the
substantive right growing out of collective-bargaining contracts.
Whether it is a state substantive right or a federal substantive right,
it does not follow necessarily that the same legal consequences will
flow from it, as would flow from other types of contracts,-commercial
construction, and the like. From anything which may be found in the
Congressional history,0 it might be inferred that Congress assumed
that there was a contract law, and that collective bargaining contracts,
and the rights arising thereunder, would be the same as in the case of
any other kind of agreement. Assuming that there was a valid grant
of jurisdiction on federal courts, to hear cases arising under state sub-
stantive contract law, the contract right growing out of the alleged
breach may vary from state to state. Industry-wide contracts might
2-' See footnote 4, supra.20 See footnotes 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, supra.
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give rise to varying rights from state to state growing out of the same
or similar alleged breaches. In fact, the "agency" definition of section
301 (e) might in itself conflict with the substantive law of the various
states, if we assume that only state substantive rights are involved. In
the states, referred to in the Report of the Senate Committee, 7 where
it is impossible to sue a union as an entity, it is impossible to decide
with certainty whether the defect is only one of procedure. It might
also be true that such states would not recognize that collective-bar-
gaining agreements of themselves establish any relationships. Since
such states would have no cases defining the status of the collective-
bargaining agreements, even though the initial obstacle was jurisdic-
tional, the federal courts would be left to guess what the state substan-
tive contract right, if any, was. At best, the federal courts could only
define and delineate what the collective-bargaining contract right of
such states ought to be. The different Courts of Appeal might develop
a common law for such states within their respective circuits, but it
would not be the same necessarily from circuit to circuit. Such varia-
tions could not be resolved by the Supreme Court unless it adopted a
uniform common law for such states, and adopted a presumption that
if a state had not defined its contract right, federal courts would
create an applicable uniform right for it. If the aim of the Labor-
Management Relations Act is to establish uniformity of regulation
through section 301, it will not have been achieved.
Without attempting an exhaustive analysis of state law as it relates
to collective-bargaining agreements, it is possible to demonstrate the
problem. More than a dozen states, by legislation, have recognized in
one way or another a substantive right arising under collective bar-
gaining contracts.' Some of the acts are couched in jurisdictional
language," others in terms of substantive right.' Other states have
27 See footnote 7, supra.
28 For a collection of these statutes see Millis and Katz, A Decade of State Labor Leg-
islation, 1937-47, 15 U. oF CH. L. REv. 282, 306, n. 248 (1948).
29 La. Gen. Stat. (Dart. Supp. 1947) Sec. 4379.20.
30 Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering 1941) sec. 1126. "Any collective bargaining agreement
between an employer and a labor organization shall be enforceable at law or in equity and
a breach of such collective agreement by any party thereto shall be subject to the same
remedies, including injunctive relief, as are available on other contracts in this state." See
also S. D. Laws (1947) ch. 94, secs. 2-3; Laws N. D. (1947) ch 242, sec 7. Cf. United
Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 563 (N. D. Ill. 1948), in which
it was held that the jurisdiction granted to a federal court under section 301 did not
indude the power to enjoin violations of a collective-bargaining agreement.
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arrived at a definition by judicial decision.' The substantive right in
several states is determined, in part, by provisions in labor relations
acts.' The nature of the right varies from state to state. There is not
complete agreement concerning the legal consequences of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement.'
-
1 Mueller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935). The
court said, "When, as to a collective contract, the judicial function is invoked, decision
must stand upon the same rules of interpretation and enforcement that prevail in other
cases of contract. We do not have, and judges cannot make, one law for one class of
contracts and another and different law for another sort." Nevertheless, the court indulged
a presumption that the union contracted as an agent of the employees, which requires
either authorization or ratification. This differs from the union's position under Sec. 301,
since the action was maintained by one of the employees (principals). See also Harper v.
Local Union No. 520, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, (Tex. 1932) Ct. of
Civ. App., 48 S. W. 2d 1033. (specific performance).
- Colo. Laws, 1943, ch. 131, sec. 17 (part of this act, Sec. 20), requiring information,
has been held unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court (A. F. of L. v. Reilly, 113
Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145 [1944]); Public Act No. 176, Mich. Laws 1939, as amended,
secs. 423.1-423.25 Compiled Laws, Mich., 1948; Chap. 440, Minn. Laws, 1939, as amend-
ed; N. Y. Laws 1937, ch. 443, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1940, chs. 4, 126, 569, 634,
689, 750, 773, and by N. Y. Laws, 1942, chs. 210, 518, and N. Y. Laws 1946, ch. 138,
and N. Y. Laws, 1946, ch. 463; Pa. Act 294, P. L. 1168, 1937, as amended, Title 43, secs.
211.1-13 Purdon's Stat. Ann.; Utah L., ch. 55, 1937, as amended, secs. 49-1-9-25, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943; Wisc. Laws, 1939, ch. 57. For a comparison of state laws, see
C. C. H., Labor Law Reporter, All State Chart, sec. 40,355 et seq. (1949). For examples
of variations, some states permit contracts for closed shops, prohibited by inference, at
least, by Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, sec. 9 (a) (3).
a For a comprehensive and cogent analysis of collective-bargaining contracts, see Len-
hoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 MICH.
L. REv. 1109 (1941). Compare, however, the definition of 'Mr. Justice Jackson, for a
possible hint whether collective contracts will be interpreted the same as other contracts in
the federal system, in J. I. Case Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 332, 334, (1944), in which
he said, for the Court: "Contracts in labor law is a term the implications of which must
be determined from the connection in which it appears. Collective bargaining between
employer and the representative of a unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to terms
which will govern hiring and work and pay in that unit... . . The negotiations between
union and management result in what often has been called a trade agrreement, rather
than a contract of employment. Without pushing the analogy too far, the agreement may,
be likened to the tariffs established by a carrier, to standard provisions prescribed by super-
vising authorities for insurance policies, or to utility schedules or rates and rules for
service, which do not of themselves establish any relationships, (emphasis supplied) but
which do govern the terms of the shipper, or insurer or customer relationship whenever
it may be established. Indeed, in some European countries, contrary to American practice,
the terms of a collectively negotiated trade agreement are submitted to a government de-
partment, and, if approved, became a governmental regulation ruling employment in the
unit."
It is obvious that in 1944, the Supreme Court concept of the substantive rights which
might flow from collective-bargaining contracts is materially different from the Congres-
sional concept, which provides, in 1947, limits of liability of unions, and definitions of
agency for the purpose of responsibility. The difference in interpretation of substantive
right provisions inherent in collective-bargaining contracts may extend to some of the
states.
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Less than twenty-five years ago, there was general agreement that
collective-bargaining agreements between employers and unions cre-
ated no rights, powers, privileges or immunities, whatsoever. They
were considered as mere written statements of purpose, or usage and
custom, possibly creating "moral" obligations, but no "legal" obliga-
tions.' To give some indirect legal effect, some courts eventually in-
dulged in agency35 and third party beneficiary devices.' A few juris-
dictions found the union to be the principal.' Today, it may be agreed
that most state jurisdictions recognize that some legal consequences
flow from such agreements, that some substantive rights are created by
the execution of such contracts.O A potential conflict exists between
the state substantive right and the federal legislation. In some states,
it is by no means dear whether this is true, because the jurisdictional
non-suability of unions as unincorporated associations has precluded
any determination of the nature, if any, of any substantive right which
might be involved in a collective-bargaining agreement. It does not
follow necessarily that the removal of the jurisdictional defect would
-' See, Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 10 ST. Louis L. REv.
1 (1925). See also, Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, 64 F. 2d 902 (C. C. A. 5th 1933),
in which the Court said, "An agreement between the managers of an industry and its
employees, whether made in an atmosphere of peace or under stress of strike or lockout
resembles in many ways a treaty. . . . No one is bound thereby to serve, and the em-
ployer is not bound to hire any particular person. It is only an agreement as to the terms
on which contracts of employment may be satisfactorily made and carried out. It is a
mutual general offer to be closed by specific acceptances. ... See also, Anderson, Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements, 15 ORE. L. Rlv. 229, 236 (1936) ; Wilson v. Airline Coal
Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. W. 753 (1933). Cf. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoom-
vaart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' & Longshoremen's Benev. Soc., 265 F. 397 (D. C. E. D.
La.) 1920; McGlohn v. Gulf & S. I. R. R. Co., 179 Miss. 396, 174 So. 250 (1937).
a Mueller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935). The
theory of this case is that the union is the agent. This requires a presumption that the
agent is authorized, or that the principal ratified the action. Except for the fact that the
union member brought the action, there is no evidence of either requirement. Cf. Hudson
v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &T. P. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47 (1913).
36McGlohn v. Gulf & S. I. R. R. Co., 179 Miss. 396, 174 So. 250 (1937), affirmed
183 Miss. 465, 184 So. 71 (1938) ; Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij v.
Stevedores' & Longshoremen's Benev. Soc., 265 F. 397 (D. C. E. D. La. 1920). Cf. Reich-
ert v. Quindazzi, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 284 (1938). (The provisions of a New York statute
affect this decision.) On the other hand, see Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky.
477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923); But see, Huston v. Washington W. & C. Co., 4 Wash.
2d 98, 102 P. 2d 685 (1940).
3 Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W.
885 (1938) ; Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923).
-s In the states referred to in the Report of the Senate Committee, footnote 7, supra,
where it is impossible to sue a union as an entity, it is impossible to ascertain what is the
nature of the substantive right, if any, arising from a collective-bargaining agreement.
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automatically cause the recognition of a substantive right under such
agreements. Even in those jurisdictions where evidence exists that
there is such a substantive right, the content and attributes of the right
vary because of expressed legislative and judicial difference and varia-
tion of state policy from state to state.' Consequently, if section 301
merely removes the jurisdictional or procedural defect, this device for
the regulation of commerce among the several states will create lack
of uniformity among the several states in the enforcement of collec-
tive-bargaining agreements. If this is the intent of Congress, it will
have been achieved.
IV.
In the preceding section, it was assumed that no federal substantive
right was created by section 301. Whether such a right was created
must be considered. If such a right was created, the nature of it is a
problem inherent here, as much as it was a problem in considering the
state right, although, of course, the federal substantive right, whatever
it is, would be uniform among the states. However, it will be neces-
sary to consider whether such a federal right is exclusive, or whether
it can co-exist with a different state right.
Substantive rights and causes of action have been created before
by the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts?' The federal courts
have had no difficulty in upholding grants of jurisdiction arising from
3 For examples of potential conflict between state substantive labor-contract law and
the federal legislation, as exemplified by Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, see
Hamer v. Nashewena Mills, 315 Mass. 160, 52 N. E. (2d) 22 (1943) ; Fashioncraft, Inc. v.
Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N. E. (2d) 1 (1943) (upholding validity of dosed shop
clauses); Moore v. I. C. R. R., 180 Miss. 276, 176 So. 593 (1937) (collective bargaining
agreements give rights of action to individual employees) ; State ex rel. Culinary Workers,
Local No. 226 v. Eighth Judicial District Court; Labor Cases, C. C. H., 65, 242 (Sup. Ct
Nev. 1949), (upholding validity of dosed shop dause) ; F. F. East Co., Inc. v. United
Oystermen's Union, 130 N. J. Eq. 292, 21 A 2d 799 (1941); Helt v. Britten-Felten Co.,
Inc., 180 Misc. 1077, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 58 (1943), (individual action derives from col-
lective agreement).
4The original admiralty substantive rights were created by the grant of jurisdiction.
U. S. CONST., Art. II1, sec. 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred upon District Courts
"exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty . . .,." In 1845, Congress
enacted a statute (5 Stat at Large, 726) entitled "An act extending the jurisdiction of
the District Courts to certain cases upon the lakes and navigable waters ..... " This
purported to confer jurisdiction "in matters of contract and tort." This act became inopera-
tive after the Supreme Court's interpretation of jurisdictional power in Genesee Chief, 12
How. 443 (U. S. 1851). Nevertheless, the admiralty causes of action had been created
by the grant of jurisdiction and the substantive rights were worked out by the federal
courts, and not worked out under the exercise of any Article I powers by Congress. See
The Eagle, 75 U. S. 15 (1868).
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the power of Congress to regulate commerce, where Congress has
expressly created federal substantive rights.' If the causes of action
created by such Congressional acts as the Federal Employers Liability
Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act do not present cases "arising
under" the Constitution and the laws of the United States, then the
attempted grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts in such acts are
invalid. On the other hand, if such grants of jurisdiction are valid,
then a federal substantive right arising under section 301 should have
the same treatment. The mere fact that it would be found to have
been created by implication, rather than by express Congressional
definition should not be a valid basis for distinction. Since the legis-
lative history shows that Congress was aware of the substantive right
problem: it may be inferred that Congress intended to leave it to
the courts to work out the nature and detail of the substantive right
by developing a "national law" or "federal common law" of collec-
tive-bargaining agreements. This would be a more charitable in-
terpretation than to assume either that the Congressional draftsmen
did not understand the implications of what they did, or that they
were inept.
If there is a federal substantive right created under section 301,
to be worked out in detail by the courts, the problem still exists
whether the courts will consider the right as one to be worked out
to conform to the rights arising out of other types of contract, or
will consider collective agreements as unique and requiring different
interpretation and definition of the rights involved.
Assuming the existence of the federal right, it is necessary to
realize that many states have a substantive right arising out of col-
lective contracts. Assuming also such a state cause of action, if the
case is filed in the state court on the state right, and diversity of
citizenship and requisite amount exist, upon transfer of the case to
the federal district court, the federal court would seem to be required
to define and interpret the contract according to state law." On the
other hand, if the case is brought in the federal court on the substan-
tive right created by section 301, the developing federal contract law
might require a different interpretation and definition of the right
41See for example, FEDERAL EMPLOYERS LIABILiTY AC, 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as
amended, 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1940); FAm LABoR STANDARDS Acr, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938),
29 U. S. C. § 216 (b) (1940).
42 See footnote 7, supra.4 3 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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arising from the same collective-bargaining contract and involving
the same facts. This possibility would not make for any uniformity
of regulation in carrying out the expressed purposes of the act."
Since section 303 expressly conferred jurisdiction on state as well
as federal courts to hear cases involving the federal torts therein
defined, and since no mention of state courts was made in section
301, it might be urged that Congress intended that all cases arising
under collective-bargaining contracts in an industry affecting com-
merce should be tried in federal courts as federal causes of action.
If such a result was intended, the Committee reports are silent on
the matter."
Of course, the federal courts would not be bound to follow state
law in cases brought under section 301, because the jurisdiction is
based on a federal question (or a federal right arising out of the
exercise of Article I powers)." A comparable problem has arisen
when there was a conflict over priorities of creditors between a state
law and the bankruptcy laws.!' It is possible that Congress has oc-
cupied the field of collective-bargaining contracts, as has been found
to be the case in other situations." However, if the courts find that
44 Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, P. L. 101, sec. 1 (b) 80th Cong.; 29 U. S. C. § 151.
Section I(b) provides in part: ". . . It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to
promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations affecting commerce .
45 See footnotes 6, 7 and 8, supra.
0 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943) ; D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. F. D. I. C., 315 U. S. 447 (1942). In the latter case, the Supreme Court said
that the liability on a note given to F. D. I. C., a federal agency, was to be determined
without regard to state law.
47 American Surety Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U. S. 269 (1946). Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the Court said, "True, we stated ...that the federal law governing distribution of a
bankrupt's estate should be applied with 'appropriate regard for rights acquired under
rules of state law.' But the extent to which state law is to be considered is in the last
analysis a matter of federal law." (emphasis supplied).
'8 In O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 113 F. 2d 539 (C. C. A. 1st
1940), the Court said, "Congress having occupied the field by enacting a fairly compre-
hensive scheme of regulation, it seems clear that questions relating to the duties, privileges
and liabilities of telegraph companies in the transmission of interstate messages must be
governed by uniform federal rules. . . . Notwithstanding Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins there still exist certain fields-and this is one--where legal relations are gov-
erned by a 'federal common law,' a body of decisional law developed by the federal courts
untrammeled by state court decisions."
In Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. 2d 663 (C. C. A. 7th 1943), the court
expressed the concept: "But to say that Congress has occupied the field . . . is only
another way of stating that federal courts may go beyond mere interpretation of the ex-
pressed words used in a statute, to decide interstitial and cognate issues so as to effect
the evident policy of the Act, either expressed or implied. .. .
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the Congressional intent was not to make the federal collective-
bargaining contract law supreme and exclusive, there would be two
conflicting bodies of contract law applying to the same contract, the
federal law, and the state law, decisions under which could not be
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, because on the
matter of interpretation of the state right, no federal question would
exist.
The courts may also have to determine whether the substantive
contract right may be waived by an express clause in the collective-
bargaining agreement, wherein the employer and labor organization
agree not to sue on any such cause of action which would arise on
breach of the contract. It is questionable whether the parties will be




Two years after the passage of the act, the evidence of judicial
answer to the problems inherent in section 301 is almost as meager
as the original evidence of Congressional intent. Very few cases have
been brought on the contract action arising under section 301. Most
of those did not consider whether a state or federal right was in-
volved, but were decided on other considerations.' Two cases have
recognized that a substantive right problem exists, but both, while
49 Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U. S. 697 (1944). Release of right for
additional payment under Fair Labor Standard Act was not enforced. Midstate Horticul-
tural Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U. S. 356 (1943). Agreement to waive period
of limitation on action by carrier was not enforced.
5o Metal Polishers . . . International Union, Local 90, A. F. of L. v. Rubin, 17 Lab.
Cas. 65, 326, C. C. H. (E. D. Pa., 1949). (Court did not consider the nature of the ac-
tion) ; Daily Review Corp. v. International T. U., No. 915, 17 Lab. Cas. 65, 292, C. C. H.
(E. D. N. Y., 1949). (Court decided only question of service of process); United Steel
Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267 (W. D. Mich., 1949). (Court did not
consider the nature of the action); United Shoe Workers v. Le Danne Footwear, Inc., 83
F. Supp. 714 (D. C. Mass., 1949). (Court decided that oral agreement entered into subse-
quent to written agreement is a valid contract on which action may be maintained under
section 301. One state case is cited to support a proposition of substantive contract law,
and several federal cases are cited to support others; it is unclear whether court considered
state or federal law controlling); United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,
80 F. Supp. 563 (N. D. IIl., 1948). (Court held that federal courts lacked authority to
enjoin violation of collective-bargaining contract under section 301); Baker and Confec-
tionery Workers, Local 492 v. National Biiscuit Co., 78 F. Supp. 517 (E. D. Pa., 1948).
(Court held that real issue was not a violation of contract, but whether employer was
obliged to bargain with union over terms of retirement plan, and that this was a matter
for N. L. R. B.)
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recognizing a substantive right, use language to support section 301
as a mere grant of jurisdiction."
In construing section 301, it has been indicated that the federal
courts, and eventually the Supreme Court, will have several choices.
First, the section may be declared unconstitutional as an attempt
to grant jurisdiction where no federal question exists. If this hap-
pens, the situation will be the same as before the passage of the act.
Second, the section may be construed as a proper grant of juris-
diction to hear cases the cause of action in which is a state substantive
right. If this result occurs, in some states it may be found that there
is no cause of action. In those states where labor organizations have
not been suable, it will be necessary to guess whether a state sub-
stantive right exists, and the federal court will necessarily be com-
pelled to define the state law without evidence of what it is. In the
remaining states, the cause of action on the collective-bargaining
agreement will vary materially from state to state because of differ-
ent judicial interpretation and legislative determinations of policy.
There will also be actual conflict between the substantive right and
section 301 because of the agency definition in section 301, which is
different from the agency definition applied to collective-bargaining
contracts in some states.
Third, the section may be construed to have created a federal sub-
stantive right, which will be defined by the development of a federal
common law. However, the court could find that this right could
51 Colonial Hardwood Floor Co. v. Int Union, 76 Supp. 493 (D. C. Md., 1948).
(This case was brought on two counts, one under section 301, the other under section 303.
A question of contractual construction arose when it was urged that the suit be stayed
pending arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act of Feb. 12, 1925, c. 213, sec. 3, 9
U. S. C. A., sec. 3. However, the question was raised that this cause did not "arise under"
the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court said, "But I think this con-
tention untenable here. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 733.. . . The Labor-Management Act
creates important substantive rights between employer and employees engaged in interstate
commerce (sic) and section 301 expressly authorizes suits of this character in district
courts of the United States." It will be noted that the Court speaks both in terms of a
mere grant of jurisdiction and also of the creation of a substantive right, although in that
connection the Court refers to "employees" rather than to unions, and limits the applica-
tion to employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce rather than to employers
and labor organizations in an industry affecting commerce). Wilson & Co., Inc. v. United
Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162 (S. D. N. Y. 1949). (The Court held that sec-
tion 301 created substantive rights, and in support thereof, quotes the above quoted state-
ment from the Colonial Hardwood Floor Co. case. The Court also rejected the contention
that section 301 infringed on the rights reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. The Court said that it is a valid federal right involved).
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co-exist with state substantive contract rights, common law or legis-
lative. Such a result would inevitably result in different interpre-
tations of the same contract under the same facts. It might even
require a federal court to define the contract one way if the action
arose under section 301 in the federal court, and another way if it
came into the federal court by removal from the state court, where
diversity of citizenship and amount were present. This would not
result in a uniform mode of regulation within the state.
Fourth, it may be decided that Congress has occupied the field,
and that contracts between employers and labor organizations rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce give rise only
to a federal substantive right which must be defined and delineated
by federal law. If this result is reached, it is not clear that Congress
intended that such cases could be tried only in the federal courts.
The legislative history might be construed as showing more of an
intent to furnish some forum, rather than to designate an exclusive
forum. 2
In the absence of a change in the legislation, the federal courts
will be required to find the answers as the cases arise, and make the
policy determinations inherent in the problems raised which were left
unstated in the obscurity of Congressional language.
Leon H. Wallace
INDIANA UNIvEasrry.
52 Quare: Is there a possibility that the state might be required to furnish a forum for
the federal cause of action? See, Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947). Mr. Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, observed: "The suggestion that the Act of Congress is not in
harmony with the policy of the state, and therefore that the courts of the state are free to
decine jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contempla-
tion does not exist. When Congress in the exertion of the power confided to it by thq
Constitution adopted that act, it spoke for all the people of all the states, and thereby
established a policy for all. That policy is as much a policy of Connecticut as if the act
had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts
of the state."
